International criminal law: a selected case by Nakhjavani, Salim
    
             	
         
              
   
     	        
         
         
            
            
  
             	
            
          
          
            
           
    
International criminal law: 
A selected case
SALIM NAKHJAVANI 
University of Cape Town
Proceedings in the first trial before the International Criminal Court 
have been stayed on grounds of non-disclosure of exculpatory evi-
dence by the Office of the Prosecutor, in circumstances described by 
the Trial Chamber as a ‘wholesale and serious abuse’. On 13 June 2008, 
the judges of Trial Chamber I — Sir Adrian Fulford (United Kingdom), 
Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica) and René Blattmann (Bolivia) — 
rendered their 44-page Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure 
of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the 
application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain 
other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008 (‘the Deci-
sion’). The Decision centres on the consistent misuse of Article 54(3)
(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘Rome 
Statute’), which permits the prosecution to obtain evidence from third 
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parties on condition of confidentiality, but solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence.
The Decision will be of interest for its detailed appraisal of the scope 
of the prosecutorial duty of disclosure — particularly its relation to 
information obtained from international organisations and national 
intelligence services on condition of confidentiality — in the context of 
a mixed legal regime in which the prosecution service straddles a dual 
role as impartial investigator and adversarial party to trial proceedings, 
and in which victims’ interests are represented in from the pre-trial 
phase. The Decision clarifies the respective roles of the prosecution and 
judiciary in evaluating the exculpatory value of evidence and deciding 
questions of non-disclosure. More broadly, the Decision may affect 
the ability of the Office to conduct effective investigations through 
cooperation with international organisations and national criminal 
justice systems, its primary mode of operation envisaged in the Rome 
Statute. Ironically, the very limitations of this mode of operation may 
at least explain — although not justify — the impugned conduct of the 
prosecution in this case.
The South African criminal lawyer will note that the question of 
disclosure of exculpatory material obtained on condition of confidenti-
ality has not yet been specifically canvassed by our courts. The Bill of 
Rights does not explicitly provide for the right of an accused person to 
full disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the hands of the State. Some 
guidance appears in the landmark, unanimous judgment in Shabalala 
and Others v Attorney-General, Transvaal, and Another 1996 (1) SA 
725 (CC), where the Constitutional Court overturned the State’s claim 
of blanket docket privilege on the basis of a purposive interpretation of 
the right to a fair trial, including the right to be informed with sufficient 
particularity of the charge, to be presumed innocent and to remain 
silent, and to adduce and challenge evidence (Interim Constitution, 
ss 25(3)(b)-(d)). In a recent judgment, S v Crossberg 2008 ZASCA 13 (20 
March 2008), the Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed that the principles 
governing disclosure developed in Shabalala ‘remain the same under 
the present Constitution’ (at para [74]). The holding in Crossberg turned 
on the State’s failure to discharge its burden of proof in a murder 
trial; thus, the treatment of disclosure should properly be considered 
obiter dicta. Writing for the majority, Navsa JA cited with approval R 
v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326, where the Supreme Court of Canada 
was unequivocal: ‘All relevant information must be disclosed subject 
to the reviewable discretion of the Crown. The material must include 
not only that which the Crown intends to introduce into evidence but 
also that which it does not. No distinction should be made between 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.’ (at 20-21).
The court in Stinchcombe’s case was careful to emphasise that 
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the obligation to disclose is ‘not absolute’ (at 16); that an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is involved; and that justifiable limitations can 
operate on scope of disclosure (for example, in cases of privileged in-
formation or risk of serious harm to an informant) as well as the timing 
of disclosure (for example, where an ongoing investigation may be 
jeopardised). As the line of Canadian jurisprudence cited in Crossberg 
makes clear, the discretion to disclose is subject to judicial review; and 
while the prosecution is afforded latitude as a ‘minister of justice’, non-
disclosure should be rare — while delayed or partial disclosure may be 
justified on a case-by-case basis, the absolute withholding of relevant 
information can only be justified on the basis of a legal privilege, and 
an unjustifiable failure to disclose will constitute ‘a very serious breach 
of legal ethics’ (see Stinchcombe; see at 16-18). A retrial is the appropri-
ate remedy, in the interests of justice, where the court of review finds 
a ‘reasonable possibility that such failure or refusal has affected the 
outcome or impacted on an accused’s rights to a fair trial’ (Crossberg at 
para [75]). This jurisprudence provides a helpful comparative backdrop 
for a critical appraisal of the stay of proceedings in Lubanga’s case.
The impugned prosecution of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, erstwhile head 
of the Union des patriotes congolais, focused on charges of recruitment 
of child soldiers in the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Investigations began in 2003; a warrant of arrest was issued 
for in March 2006 and charges confirmed against the accused in early 
2007. While pre-trial proceedings have already established substantial 
grounds to believe that Lubanga committed the crimes charged, an 
abuse of process by the prosecution — without evidence of bad faith — 
has met with a stay of proceedings and now obliges the Trial Chamber 
to consider the release of the accused. The potentially wasted costs 
associated with the Lubanga investigation are not readily discernible 
from the budgets and reports of the Court, which are function-specific 
rather than situation-specific. It is noteworthy that the total budget 
for the Court in 2007 amounted to almost €90m (R1.1bn), covering 
investigations in four situations across Africa. In its financial estimates, 
the Court has projected the cost of trial proceedings in the Lubanga 
case at almost €4m (R50m) per year, from 2008.
The International Criminal Court is a fully-fledged international 
judicial institution operating within a world order that displays only 
embryonic international executive authority. For instance, the Office of 
the Prosecutor has minimal direct enforcement powers on State terri-
tory and depends largely upon a detailed cooperation regime provided 
in the Rome Statute, implemented through domestic legislation such as 
the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act (Act 27 of 2002). While States Parties to the Rome Statute 
have a general obligation to cooperate with requests for assistance from 
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the Court (Article 87), including the Office of the Prosecutor, almost 
all information relevant to the investigation must be obtained through 
requests to States. States with sophisticated intelligence capabilities 
will usually be the custodians of the most relevant, in-depth and up-
to-date information concerning the alleged activities and whereabouts 
of potential targets for investigation and prosecution. Such information 
is highly relevant to the Prosecutor from the pre-investigative analysis 
phase governed by Article 15 of the Rome Statute, through to the inve-
stigation phase, eventual requests for warrants of arrest and confirma-
tion of charges before trial. Information is initially sought from open 
sources, but as analysis and investigation intensifies, nothing in the 
Rome Statute prevents the Prosecutor from seeking information from 
confidential sources. In this context, Article 54(3)(e) sets out a key 
prosecutorial power:
Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations […]
3. The Prosecutor may: […]
(e)  Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or 
information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidenti-
ality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the 
provider of the information consents;
The procedural history of the Decision establishes that the Office of 
the Prosecutor entered Article 54(3)(e) confidentiality agreements cov-
ering some 1632 documents relevant to the charges confirmed against 
Lubanga, which concerned only one attack against one village on a 
single day (at para [74]). Of these, 207 documents comprised two cat-
egories of evidence subject to disclosure: (i) potentially exculpatory 
information; and (ii) information material to the preparation of the 
defence (at para [63]). 156 documents were provided by the United 
Nations; the other 51 were presumably provided by State sources. 
None of these documents were disclosed to the defence, and only 32 
were provided to the Trial Chamber itself, albeit in redacted form and 
without identification of the information-provider (at para [64]).
The Trial Chamber rightly notes that but for the confidentiality agree-
ments routinely entered by the Office of the Prosecutor when seeking 
information, the 207 exculpatory or otherwise material documents 
would have been fully disclosed. The Trial Chamber finds that the pros-
ecution has given Article 54(3)(e) ‘a broad and incorrect interpretation’ 
(at para [72]):
‘[…] the prosecution’s general approach has been to use Article 54(3)(e) to 
obtain a wide range of materials under the cloak of confidentiality, in order 
to identify from those materials evidence to be used at trial (having obtained 
the information provider’s consent). This is the exact opposite of the proper 
use of the provision, which is, exceptionally, to allow the prosecution to 
receive information or documents which are not for use at trial but which 
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are instead intended to “lead” to new evidence. The prosecution’s approach 
constitutes a wholesale and serious abuse, and a violation of an important 
provision which was intended to allow the prosecution to receive evidence 
confidentially, in very restrictive circumstances’ (para [73]).
The Rome Statute is subject to a rule of interpretation requiring con-
sistency with internationally-recognised human rights (Art 21(3)). After 
canvassing provisions of international human rights instruments and 
European jurisprudence on the right to a fair trial, the Trial Chamber 
‘unhesitatingly’ concludes that the fundamental right to a fair trial in-
cludes an ‘entitlement to disclosure of exculpatory material’ (at para 
[77]). Given the significance of the Lubanga case for Africa, it is regret-
table that the Chamber’s analysis does not draw on the broad ‘right to 
defence’ provided in Article 7(1)(c) of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. Consistent with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Chamber finds that even if 
the public interest favours limiting access to certain types of material, 
that ‘the public interest […] is excluded where its application would 
deny to the accused the opportunity to establish his or her innocence’ 
(Prosecutor v Brđanin and Talić, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Public Version of 
the Confidential Decision on the Alleged Illegality of Rule 70 of 6 May 
2002 (23 May 2002), at para [19]; Decision, at para [80]).
In defining the scope of the duty of disclosure, the Trial Chamber 
is rightly guided by the explicit language of Article 67(2) of the Rome 
Statute, concerning rights of the accused. The Chamber classifies as ‘ex-
culpatory material’ subject to disclosure ‘evidence in the Prosecutor’s 
possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to show 
the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or 
which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence’ (at para [59]). 
This is in addition to the right of the accused to inspect ‘any books, 
documents, photographs and other tangible objects in the possession 
or control of the Prosecutor, which are material to the preparation of 
the defence or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence…’, 
as provided in Rule 77 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
Court.
The Decision also clarifies significantly the respective roles of the 
prosecution and the judiciary in assessing the evidentiary value of ex-
culpatory material and its potential non-disclosure. Although the pros-
ecution is expected to ‘make the initial decision as to the exculpatory 
value or effect of any piece of evidence…once this threshold is passed 
and it is accepted that the material has, potentially, an exculpatory 
effect, only the Chamber can make a decision on non-disclosure if ex-
ceptional circumstances so require’ (at para [88]) [emphasis in original]. 
This approach appears similar to that of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Stinchcombe: ‘The initial obligation to separate “the wheat from the 
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chaff” must therefore rest with Crown counsel’, noted Sopinka J for 
that Court, while emphasising that this exercise of discretion remains 
subject to judicial review (at 16). As mentioned, the approach in Stinch-
combe has been approved by the Constitutional Court in Shabalala 
and, applying the Final Constitution, by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Crossberg.
In Lubanga’s case, the Trial Chamber dismisses out of hand submis-
sions that the prosecution has discretion to decide whether or not 
potentially exculpatory evidence will only impact in principle on the 
Chamber’s decision, rather than having a material impact in fact on the 
Chamber’s determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused (at 
para [87]), holding that this is a matter for the Court to decide, in ac-
cordance with the explicit provisions of Article 67(2) the Rome Statute. 
The rather creative suggestion that alternate, similar evidence in the 
hands of the accused relieves the prosecution of the duty to disclose a 
particular piece of exculpatory evidence is also dismissed — ‘the right 
of the accused’, observes the Chamber, ‘is to both items’ (at para [60]).
It is here that the prosecution would seem to trip on the drafting of 
its own confidentiality agreements. Although the text of the specific 
agreements is not in the public domain, the language would presum-
ably mirror that of Article 18(3) of the Relationship Agreement between 
the Court and the United Nations, an instrument subordinate to the 
Rome Statute, which provides:
The United Nations and the Prosecutor may agree that the United Nations 
provide documents or information to the Prosecutor on condition of confi-
dentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence and that 
such documents or information shall not be disclosed to other organs of 
the Court or to third parties, at any stage of the proceedings or thereafter, 
without the consent of the United Nations (Decision, para. 65) [emphasis 
added].
An obligation not to disclose information to ‘other organs of the Court’ 
effectively bars the prosecution from disclosing such information to 
Chambers from appraisal or review, even ex parte., which amounts 
to an unjustifiable extension of Article 54(3)(e) and a violation of the 
rights of the accused enshrined in the Rome Statute. In line with inter-
national human rights jurisprudence and consistent with the general 
approach favoured by the South African courts, it is the judges, not 
the prosecution, who are ‘solely competent’ to permit the exceptional 
non-disclosure of evidence, even on public interest immunity grounds 
(Decision, at para [84]). Failure to lay such evidence before the trial 
judge for assessment will amount to a violation of the fair trial rights 
of the accused (see e.g., Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom, European 
Court of Human Rights, Case No. 28901/95 (16 February 2000), at 
para [66]); Decision, at para [82]-[84]). The Chamber finds that ‘each 
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individual document purporting to contain potentially exculpatory 
material’ must be ‘individually examined’ by the trial judges in order 
to assess whether non-disclosure amounts to a breach of the rights of 
the accused (at para [89], [92]) — to which the prosecution could only 
offer the possibility that the Chamber ‘may be provided at some stage 
in the future with no more than incomplete or insufficient materials’ 
(at para [91]).
The choice facing the prosecution, which the Chamber describes as 
‘clear and stark’, is also singularly unenviable: disclose the full contents 
of the relevant documents and undermine crucial information flow and 
working relationships with organisations in the field (particularly the 
United Nations), potentially triggering the international responsibility 
of the Office of the Prosecutor, or safeguard the integrity of confiden-
tiality agreements and commit an abuse of process by negating what 
the Chamber characterises and ‘one of the essential preconditions of a 
fair trial’ (at para [91]).
A number of victims of Lubanga’s acts were granted leave to par-
ticipate in the proceedings and, through their legal representatives, 
opposed a stay of proceedings as a remedy within the jurisdiction of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber only, and nonetheless available only in cases of 
inadmissibility or lack of jurisdiction (at para [55]). It is troubling that 
the Chamber does not engage at all with the merits of these submis-
sions, presumably accepting as common cause between prosecution 
and defence that the power to grant a stay of proceedings is indeed 
an inherent power of the Trial Chamber (see at para [53]-[54]). Serious 
engagement with the arguments raised by victims would have lent 
greater credence to the expression of ‘great reluctance’ with which the 
Chamber concludes its Decision, noting that ‘victims will be denied 
an opportunity to participate in a public forum, in which their views 
and concerns were to have been presented and their right to receive 
reparations will be affected’; and that victims have ‘in this sense, been 
excluded from justice’ (at para [95]).
Indeed, one wonders whether a stay of proceedings was necessary 
in the circumstances. An order compelling the Office of the Prosecutor 
to disclose potentially exculpatory material to the Trial Chamber ex 
parte would seem the appropriate remedy in the first instance, engag-
ing a protective mechanism for the rights of the accused, minimising 
the impact of the rights and interests of victims while perhaps lending 
greater impetus to the efforts of the prosecution to renegotiate the 
terms of its impugned confidentiality agreements in line with the Rome 
Statute and international human rights law. In medio stat virtus.
